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‘Divided Within Itself’: The Parliamentary Labour ‘Right’ and the Demise of Post-
war Revisionist Social Democracy in the 1970s 
 
The article seeks to identify a neglected dimension of the ‘crisis’ and schism of British 
social democracy in the 1970s from within the ranks of the parliamentary Labour ‘right’ 
itself. Accounts of the so-called ‘Labour right’ and its influential revisionist social 
democratic tradition have emphasised its generic cohesion and uniformity over contextual 
analysis of its inherent intellectual, ideological and political range and diversity. The 
article seeks to evaluate differential responses of Labour’s ‘right-wing’ and revisionist 
tendency as its loosely cohesive framework of Keynesian social democracy imploded in 
the 1970s as a means of demonstrating its relative incoherence and fragmentation. The 
‘crisis of social democracy’ revealed much more starkly its complex, heterogeneous 
character, irremediably ‘divided within itself’ over a range of critical political and policy 
themes and the basis of social democratic political philosophy itself. The article argues 
that it was its own wider political fragmentation and ideological introspection in the face 
of the ‘crisis’ of its historic ‘belief system’ which led to the facture of Labour’s 
‘dominant coalition’ and the rupture of British social democracy. 
 









The amorphous catch-all concept of the ‘Labour right’ is of course not without its 
difficulties. Designation of the label ‘right-wing’ to individuals and groups of a left-wing 
party is often problematic and unsatisfactory, given its often pejorative implications.1 
There has also been a tendency to conflate complex (and often conflicting) groups of 
traditions and ideas in some sort of undifferentiated non-left, moderate and often loyalist 
tendency. Richard Heffernan, for example, sums up the orthodoxy of writing Labour’s 
history when he describes the party as a ‘left–right political coalition fashioned by its 
labourist political culture…The historical division most…alluded to is that between a 
majority right and a minority left’. The traditionally dominant position of the former in 
the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) has ensured a ‘centrist, indeed predominantly 
right-wing institution’ and ‘leadership support base’.2 Hence, Alan Warde has been able 
to suggest that it is ‘unfortunate that ideological diversity within the Party has been 
distilled into the hoary imagery of a left-right continuum’. While ‘serviceable enough in 
everyday usage, the distinction becomes a liability in precise, historical analysis’. One of 
the principal objections is that, by failing to acknowledge the ideational range of inexact 
or approximate political categories and ‘neglecting to specify the content of alternative 
[philosophies and strategies] at stake’, it ‘imposes non-existent continuities’ and 
uniformity. The ‘fact that [Labour’s] right has been, variously [and often simultaneously], 
socialist, utilitarian, and liberal, with distinct and important consequences for British 




By contrast, this article seeks to disassemble and disaggregate what many have 
considered to be Labour’s homogeneous ‘right-wing’ and ‘revisionist’ tendency. It 
identifies the heterogeneous political character and ideological dimensions of Labour’s 
so-called post-war ‘dominant coalition’. It addresses this broader ideological and political 
terrain in the context of post-war dilemmas, debates and divisions of revisionist social 
democracy that culminated in its fracture and then rupture in the 1970s and early 1980s. 
It suggests that the ostensibly cohesive ‘Labour right’ was rather a complex, 
heterogeneous, loose coalition of tendencies, profoundly divided over a range of political 
themes and even foundational philosophical principles. By foregrounding its intrinsic 
ideological diversity rather than promoting its explanatory expedient homogeneity, it is 
arguably less surprising that the ‘Labour right’ and its broadly revisionist social 
democratic mind-set was found ‘divided within itself’ as the loosely adhesive framework 
of Keynesian and ‘Croslandite’ social democracy imploded during the 1970s.4 It was the 
inability of this influential and diverse body of Labour opinion to unite in the face of 
existential external and internal threats, as much an effect of its own political 
fragmentation and ideological introspection as that of a resurgent ‘Labour left’, that had 
important consequences for the Labour Party, social democracy and British politics. 
 
Firstly, the article considers some of the conceptual difficulties of defining the ‘Labour 
right’ in terms of standard criteria used for assignment to Labour’s broad left-right 
ideological spectrum. Secondly, it addresses potential analytical limitations of principal 
conceptualisations of Labour’s traditionally dominant ‘right-wing’ or ‘revisionist’ 
tendency, which largely neglect the underlying complexity of ideas, accents and habits, 
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preferences and implicit tensions of the ‘Labour right’, and the latent and incipient 
political fissures of Labour’s revisionist social democracy itself. It provides a sympathetic 
critique of attempts to disaggregate Labour’s dominant centre-right coalition to offer 
more discriminating and fluid conceptions of its constituent beliefs, ideas, traditions, 
personal affiliations, political strategies and tactical considerations. Thirdly, it addresses 
the theoretical basis of its ideological and political disposition(s), including the potential 
and prospective conflict of core concepts of ‘equality’ and ‘liberty’ in Labour’s 
revisionist social democracy. Finally, it identifies potential sources of conflict and 
division and their impending consequences in pivotal episodes of economic and industrial 
policy. This putative friction of social democratic philosophy was expressed in critical 
policy and political disputes over industrial relations and trade union reform and the 
practical limits of public spending commitments of Labour governments in the 1970s. 
Ultimately, the longstanding tensions and nascent divisions of revisionist social 
democracy played out in internal party debates and strategies and differential outlooks 
and subsequent trajectories of Labour’s ‘social democrats’ following the 1979 election 
defeat, a perspective that is routinely overlooked or underplayed in explanations of the 
Labour’s split and formation of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in 1981. 
 
‘Defining’ the ‘Labour Right’ 
 
As noted, the nebulous concept of the ‘Labour right' is difficult to define or classify in a 
circumscribed and objective manner. One difficulty is that ‘few in the Labour Party admit 
to being on its right unless they are about to jump ship’. In their ideological battles with 
5 
 
the ‘Bevanites’ or ‘Tribunites’ in the 1950s, for example, the ‘Gaitskellite’ tendency 
claimed to represent the centre of the party in their loyalty to the party leadership against 
the socialist left.5 The so-called ‘centre’ and ‘right’ of the parliamentary party are not 
always clearly distinguishable. It is ‘difficult to decide where the line is’.6 Where, for 
instance, does the ‘large and amorphous’ centre of the party, or even the ‘Morrisonian 
consolidators’, give way to the 'firm right'? 7  
 
In their classic study of the origins, formation and political trajectory of the SDP, Crewe and 
King provide definitions of varying degrees of specificity in their attempt to explain the 
rupture of British social democracy. On a very broad level, they define Labour's pre-
secessionist right-wing as ‘all those...who did not think of themselves as left-wingers and 
did not belong to left-wing organisations like the Tribune Group or the Campaign for 
Labour Party Democracy’. Accordingly, there were ‘about 150 MPs on the Labour right in 
1981, comprising most of those who did not vote for Michael Foot on the first ballot’ of the 
1980 leadership contest. A tighter definition might reduce the number ‘to about 120’, 
somewhere between those who voted for Denis Healey on the first ballot (112) and those 
who voted for him on the second (129), although not all those who voted for Healey might 
be considered committed right-wingers. They also suggest that a different prior indicator of 
party allegiance produces a similar outcome. 118 MPs, who in July 1975 signed a letter of 
support for Reg Prentice in his deselection battle with his left-wing constituency party in 




There were a number of partly overlapping right-wing factional groupings in the PLP in the 
1970s.9 The Manifesto Group, formed in 1974 primarily to offset the increasingly influential 
Tribune Group and organise the right-wing slate for shadow cabinet elections, could depend 
on a core membership of around eighty, but this reflected a broader centre-right range of 
opinion in the party.10 The combined vote of the ‘two indisputably right-wing candidates’, 
Jenkins and Healey, in the first round of the 1976 leadership contest was eighty-six, but was 
arguably not an absolute reflection of right-wing representation in the PLP, as a number 
considered to be of the right supported Callaghan as the most effective anti-left unity 
candidate.11 None of these estimations appear adequate or tell us much about the constituent 
traditions, beliefs, ideas, preferences and strategies of the ‘Labour right’ by the mid-1970s. 
Beyond narrow personal affiliations and tactical considerations, there is a need to say more 
about the criteria used to define placement on Labour’s left-right ideological spectrum. 
 
‘Revisionists’ and ‘Consolidators’, ‘Social Tendencies’ and Intellectual Currents of 
the ‘Labour Right’ 
 
Dimensions of the ‘Labour right’ have been represented in three main ways. Firstly, there 
are those who emphasise the standard left-right dichotomy and, occasionally, a nebulous, 
non-aligned centre, motivated by the desire ‘to hold the ring and reconcile the warring 
factions’.12 The basic distinction has often been framed in terms of divergent attitudes to 
the centrality of public ownership and the meaning of socialism.13 Secondly, those who 
adopt variations of a rudimentary distinction within the ‘Labour right’ between 
intellectual, revisionist social democrats and non-intellectual, pragmatic, trade union 
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right.14 These broadly useful, if fixed, schemas frequently posit homogeneous, 
unchanging ‘doctrinal’ blocs or factions that cohere around fundamental ideological 
positions on a single theme or set of related issues. They often do not account for intrinsic 
complexity or anomalies of such broad categories in particular contingent historical 
contexts or political circumstances. There has also been an inclination to conflate the 
parliamentary Labour right with a dominant revisionist leadership tendency, and lump 
together the non-revisionist right in an ill-defined ‘centre’ or ‘consolidator’ camp. They 
also say little about the diversity and contradictions of Labour revisionism itself. 
Rudimentary distinctions of ‘Labour right’ tendencies have been consolidated against the 
backdrop of the SDP split in a ‘loyalist and secessionist’ framework.15 Thirdly, there has 
been some attempt, partially characterised by recognition of recurrent, systematic intra-
party ‘segmental’ competition that often transcends conventional party dimensions or 
exposition of underlying intellectual and philosophical currents, to provide a more 
eclectic sense of the constituent traditions, ideas and strategies of the ‘Labour right’.16 
 
The orthodoxy of circumscribing the ‘Labour right’ is seen in standard conceptions of its 
role in the wider party, particularly in relation to public ownership. Thus, ‘right’ was 
‘simply used in the labour movement to denote the established leadership of that 
movement and its policies…For over sixty years ‘Right’ has meant those who wish to 
move slowly, if at all, towards a socialist society in which the major part of the economy 
will be collectively owned’. Alternatively, variations of a distinction between, for 
instance, the ‘machine-union Right’ and the ‘Fabian intellectual Right’ have been 
presented. Historically, they shared support for parliamentary democracy, belief in 
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limited nationalisation and opposition to forms of revolutionary socialism and 
communism. The ‘machine-union Right’ was sustained through the 1930s-50s by trade 
union leaders such as Ernest Bevin and party organisers such as Herbert Morrison. As the 
‘right’ dominated the party at critical points, it had little need of theoretical justification 
and principal intellectual influences were Liberals, Keynes and Beveridge. By the 1950s, 
the ‘Labour right’ was broadly identified with its support for consolidation of the policies 
and achievements of the post-war Attlee governments. Gaitskell’s emergence as party 
leader in 1955 aroused a desire to develop a clearer intellectual case for Labour’s social 
democracy which, in turn, precipitated a clearer distinction between ‘revisionists’ and 
‘consolidators’ as Labour’s ‘two schools of moderation’. His efforts to ‘redefine the 
party’s ideology and purpose’ helped to elaborate a ‘specifically ‘Right’ ideology, which 
sequentially ‘served those calling themselves social-democrats. Nearly all…[SDP] 
defectors [were] those who followed Gaitskell in this exercise between 1955 and 1963’.17 
The latter points particularly represent questionable assertions which fail to address the 
historic and contingent dynamics, tensions and divisions of Labour’s social democratic 
revisionism and subsequent ‘post-revisionist’ initiatives in the 1970s.18  
 
Arguably, ‘consolidators’ were less distinguishable, cohesive and ‘organised’ as a 
tendency of the parliamentary Labour right. They lacked the intellectual foundations of 
Labour revisionism and lacked any firm organisational basis, but ‘possessed enough 
stable characteristics to merit separate recognition’. The amorphous social democratic 
‘consolidator’ tendency was significant as much for the range and influence of its 
personnel as its political strategy. Parliamentary representatives of this tendency at 
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various points have included an assortment of experience and opinion of the ‘Labour 
right’, ranging from Jim Callaghan, Healey, Roy Hattersley who, like Healey, had a more 
ambiguous relationship with ‘Jenkinsite’ revisionism, Eric Varley, Fred Mulley and John 
Golding and, more recently, the likes of Gerald Kaufman and Austin Mitchell. Crosland 
also ‘drifted towards this camp after tactically deserting Jenkins around 1972’. Centre-
right trade union leaders ‘proved firm advocates’, among whom there was ‘hostility 
towards the Left, but also a will [to keep] Jenkins at arms-length’. Key ‘consolidator’ 
themes included constitutionalism, antagonism towards Marxist and other doctrinaire 
political philosophy and a ‘marked distaste’ for factionalism of both left and right 
varieties. In the absence of an explicitly intellectual position, ‘consolidators’ exhibited 
‘other, less sophisticated, identities’. They were essentially ‘Labour loyalists, orthodox 
and moderate, [largely] working class in personnel and character’ Their primary concerns 
included ‘Labour unity, halting the Left, winning elections, and consolidating Labour in 
public office’. Although ‘Revisionism and Consolidationism occupied…common ground 
[on issues of defence, if not always Europe]…their accents, styles…priorities [and tactics 
often] differed. So too did their ultimate destinations’.19 
 
Variations of the standard ‘consolidator-revisionist’ distinction of the ‘Labour right’ in 
relation to policy preferences is not without its limitations. As noted, attitudes to the 
Common Market were not an unambiguous reflection of divisions between them.20 A 
number of ostensible ‘consolidators’ cut their ideological and political teeth as erstwhile 
Gaitskellite revisionists. Although he remained to fight inside the Labour Party in 1981, 
as a self-professed, unreconstructed Croslandite egalitarian and pro-European, Roy 
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Hattersley, for instance, would not be considered to be a ‘consolidator’ in the 
Morrisonian or even Callaghanite sense.21 Although he was to develop a more 
‘consolidatory’ approach as politician and minister in the 1970s, Crosland himself also 
uneasily straddled the conventional ‘revisionist-consolidator’ distinction.22 The post-1981 
split in the Labour Party is used as an almost post-hoc justification of a distinction 
between separatist, right-wing ‘revisionists’ and loyal centrist ‘consolidators’. Labour’s 
post-war revisionist tradition is reduced to the relatively small, liberal, unequivocally pro-
European and ultimately secessionist ‘Jenkinsites’. 
 
Further attempts to construct the main currents and encounters of Labour’s post-war 
strategic thinking have been framed in essentially ‘cultural’ terms as a contest between 
factions or ‘social tendencies’ advocating competing strategies or ‘visions’. This 
perspective contends that ‘intra-party conflict can best be understood in terms of 
competing strategies’, in which ‘strategy is more than ideology and where segments, as 
bearers of strategy, are not reducible simply to organized groups with boundaries 
identifiable through the conscious appropriation of a group identity’. Participants are 
understood as ‘collective bearers of social interests within a complex social system which 
[acts as] a severe constraint on both consciousness and action’. These intra-party 
‘segments’ and ‘strategies’ are variously defined as ‘social reformist’, ‘fundamentalist’ 
and ‘technocratic-collectivist’ and ‘Keynesian socialist’ – ‘qualitative’ and ‘technocratic’. 
‘Social reformism’ provided the ‘architecture’ of the post-war ‘consensus’, and consisted 
primarily of ‘the New Thinkers’, the ‘Gaitskellites’ or ‘Revisionists’ who, ‘instead of 
reviving socialism, substituted a quite distinct tradition of political thought – New 
11 
 
Liberalism’. Socialist ‘fundamentalism’ is represented as the antithesis of, and 
subordinate to, ‘social reform’. ‘Technocratic- collectivism’ is described as largely a 
temporary expedient; as a product of those who frequently ‘seek to procure a compromise 
between various segments in the Party’. It is considered either as ‘opportunistic 
pragmatism, or…‘centrist’ tactic aimed at establishing unity’. ‘Technocratic-
collectivism’ lacked the ‘ideological coherence of Social Reformism. It was a hybrid 
combination of...themes, which bore…relationship to classical Fabianism, but…drew on 
several traditions of thought within the Labour heritage’.23 
  
This perspective usefully locates Labour’s intra-party dimensions and tendencies in wider 
currents and conflicts over the party’s social strategy. It acknowledges the demise of 
‘social reformism’, particularly in the period 1970-78. It further recognises that at 
different times each of the respective ‘strategies’ or ‘visions’ divided, ‘producing an 
additional or alternative understanding…from within the original’, including the 
bifurcation of ‘Keynesian socialism’ into ‘liberal’ and ‘socialist’ variants, the ‘first signs 
of which emerged in the 1950s, though the major split occurred in the early 1970s’. 
However, the (re)construction of ‘pure types of strategic orientation’ remains reminiscent 
of standard, often undifferentiated, political categories of left, right and centre, or 
fundamentalism, revisionism and the compromise of centre-left technocratic ‘modern 





With the odd important exception, few studies have directly addressed the ‘intellectual 
stockpot’ of Labour’s political thought. Histories of the Labour Party have often ‘tended 
to ignore the political thought underlying its development’, and influential views of 
Labour as a ‘non-ideological party, intent merely on gaining parliamentary power 
irrespective of principle’, have tended to neglect the ‘diversity and limitations of its 
political thought’.24 Arguably, this has been partly a reflection of the perceived 
‘moderation’ and ‘pragmatism’ of a historically dominant and established right-wing 
parliamentary leadership. Efforts to identify its constituent traditions, ideas and general 
‘intellectual milieu’, which challenge ‘received opinion of the Labour Right being a 
homogeneous group’, go some way to explaining the underlying intellectual and political 
variability of ‘subsequent events and divisions within the Party’s hegemonic group’. 
These intellectual traditions have been variously presented as ‘radical liberalism’ 
associated with Roy Jenkins, with its intellectual roots in the thinking of Edwardian New 
Liberalism; the intellectual ‘Fabianism’ of Hugh Gaitskell; the ‘democratic socialism’ 
best represented in the work of Tony Crosland; the ostensible ‘trade union economism’ 
and ‘non-intellectual gradualism’ of the likes of Jim Callaghan and George Brown; and 
the ‘pragmatic radicalism’ of such diverse ‘centrists’ as Wilson, Healey, Richard 
Crossman and Peter Shore, whose ‘rhetoric [was] often at variance with their practice’, 
and who shared a ‘technocratic approach to problems and a belief in statism in the sense 
of running the economy and social welfare provisions’.25 
 
These ‘groups of ideas’ are often conflated in manageable political ‘chunks’, although 
Tim Bale strikes a  note of caution that the ‘interaction of ideology and political actors’ is 
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far from clear. It assumes that abstract, ‘rootless’ and ‘exogenous, pre-existing 
ideological preferences’ are the source of political perceptions and preferences, and 
neglects ‘how the variations in those preferences’ are, at least in part, created and 
recreated by ‘variations in institutional location’ and the ‘power-political’ creed. It 
suggests an overly instrumental link between ‘ideologies and the interests of the various 
components of a party’, and contributes to the artificial separation of the ‘world of power 
struggles evidenced in the nitty gritty of manoeuvres over rules, roles and regulations’, on 
the one hand, and ‘some disembodied universe we call ‘political thought’’, expressed in 
sacred tracts and texts, on the other.26 
 
A Theory of the ‘Labour Right’? The Formative and Cohesive Influence of The 
Future of Socialism 
 
A distinct literature of ‘Labour right’ theory emerged in the aftermath of the 
achievements of the 1945-51 Labour governments in the writings of the so-called ‘New 
Thinkers’. Broadly, they aimed to revise traditional socialist analysis on the basis that the 
excesses of pre-war capitalism had been ameliorated by the welfare policies of the Attlee 
governments, and the socio-economic changes of the post-war years had rendered 
capitalism manageable for social purposes.27 Crosland’s subsequent major work, The 
Future of Socialism (1956), delivered by far the most sustained and fluent synthesis of 
post-war revisionist social democratic thought. It offered a core revisionist framework, 





Crosland forcefully deconstructed traditional socialist arguments concerning the nature of 
capitalism as it manifested itself ‘in post-war British…society after several years of 
Labour government’. The harsh, private and profit-driven character of pre-war capitalism 
had been dismantled and replaced by a ‘qualitatively different kind of society’.29 In light 
of the apparent transition to a reconfigured ‘social capitalism’, he proposed a significant 
revision of traditional socialist ‘means and ends’. On the basis of changes in the 
economic order, he predicted growth on a scale sufficient to produce an adequate fiscal 
dividend to underwrite the case for the redistributive egalitarianism at the core of his 
ideological schema. The particular economic arrangements were less important; it was 
the social management of economic growth that now mattered. The reformulation of 
democratic socialism emphasised consistent and stable economic growth, the expansion 
and equalisation of educational opportunities and a mixed and balanced public-private 
industrial sector that reflected changing social trends and aspirations.    
 
Crosland’s work represented an attempt to recast the conceptual balance of Labour’s 
socialism in ethical rather than economic terms. His ideas unsurprisingly met with strong 
‘fundamentalist’ resistance and ‘came to stand for the platform of the Right within the 
party’. They offered ‘an intellectual expression to the concerns and aspirations of many 
on the right…of the party’ and, in the hands of the new revisionist leader, Gaitskell, his 
‘writings [were] an important weapon against the Bevanite Left’. In the institutional 
factional context, his concern to shift ‘from an economic to a social conception of 
equality’ and demote traditional socialist arguments and methods, Crosland’s work was 
15 
 
caricatured as a right-wing Gaitskellite manifesto. Although his revisionist analysis broke 
with Labour’s established doctrine, Crosland’s case ‘pursued traditional socialist lines’ 
and ‘both inequality and class feature strongly’. His prescriptions included a strong 
degree of redistributive equality. It was largely his critique of ‘sacred means’ that angered 
traditionalists, ‘even when his ideas were radical in their policy implications…or when 
they expressed concerns which were shared by the Left’.30 
 
Although the precise form of Crosland’s ‘democratic equality’ remained undefined, he 
intended a thoroughgoing transformative equality that sought to overthrow traditional 
patterns of status, privilege and wealth in British society.31 To view him simply as ‘on the 
right’ or as a ‘revisionist’ conceals more than it reveals of the far-reaching character of 
his analysis and prescriptions. His explicit egalitarian philosophy and vision of 
democratic socialism distinguished him from less intuitively egalitarian revisionists such 
as Jenkins and Douglas Jay, who were brought together as much by the force of 
Gaitskell’s charismatic leadership and the prospect of Labour government after a number 
of fruitless years in opposition in the 1950s as by a shared sense of instinctive 
egalitarianism.32 As more pressurised conditions for growth and public expenditure in the 
1970s undermined the economic foundations of Crosland’s egalitarian philosophy, a 
distinctive ‘liberal’ strand of former Gaitskellite revisionism was already moving away 
from (if they had ever fully accepted) the precepts of ‘Croslandism’ (as was a more 




‘Revisionists Revise’: Misreading Labour Party Revisionism 
 
Labour Party revisionism is seen to represent the ‘most influential perspective concerning 
social democracy in [Britain] since the Second World War’ and, during the 1950s, was 
‘established as the basis of Labour’s social democracy’.34 The ‘revisionist approach’ is 
often represented as a uniform, fixed and hegemonic intellectual project.35 Revisionism is 
defined simply in terms of views of a particular socialist method (nationalisation) and 
broader economic preference (reformed capitalism).36 However, the term 
‘is…problematic, a short-hand for a clutch of sometimes disparate approaches’. Its 
analytical value depends on ‘remembering the historical disjunctures and complexities of 
that very tradition’.37 David Lipsey, Crosland’s erstwhile political advisor, reminds us of 
its relative fluidity and that ‘revisionists revise’. Revisionism, as a relative, historically 
contextual and progressive disposition, is ‘not a body of doctrine. It was not 
what…Bernstein [or Crosland] thought. Revisionism was and is a cast of mind…that 
says: here is the world, here are the most important facts about it, here are the values we 
bring to bear on the facts, here are our conclusions’.38                  
 
On this reading, ‘revisionism’ represents a historically-dependent and informed process 
or task of (re)emphasis and modernisation, as opposed to an inclusive ideological or 
doctrinal perspective. It does not possess a set of core ideological principles but rather 
offers a practical means to pursue and accommodate change.39 It is a tradition only in the 
sense that it is a continuous reflection of specific practices: scrutiny of means, analysis of 
contemporary perspectives and policies and some radicalism in a willingness to embrace 
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change. Labour Party revisionism has incorporated diverse, historically-specific varieties 
of political thought, ideas and strategies, influenced by and ranging from Bernstein, 
Tawney, Jay, Durbin, Crosland, the ‘post-revisionist’ concerns of the 1970s ‘Jenkinsites’ 
and others, through to the ‘neo-revisionism’ of those such as Hattersley, Giles Radice, 
Bryan Gould and Austin Mitchell in the 1980s, and even the rethinking of fundamentals 
undertaken by ‘New’ Labour in the 1990s.40  
 
Labour Party revisionism of the mid-1950s was not without its own distinctions and 
discrepancies. It included a ‘complex of ideas’ associated with a wider grouping of ‘self-
styled ‘revisionist’ thinkers’, ranging from the ‘ethical’ revisionism of Allan Flanders’ 
(and the Socialist Union) to the ‘‘sociological’ current of…Crosland’ and Michael 
Young, with Rita Hinden’s Socialist Commentary offering an intellectual bridge to the 
different ‘social democratic networks’.41 While Gaitskellite revisionists were broadly 
united on what they saw as problematic aspects of traditional socialist doctrine, there was 
far less consensus on the conceptual basis of their own social democracy, and they 
consequently failed to establish a ‘clear unequivocal doctrine of equality complete with 
strategies suitable for its realization’.42 Differences over essential ingredients of social 
democratic theory and politics, including redistribution, education policy and the nature 
of equality itself exposed a ‘void in Gaitskellite egalitarianism’, and indicated a source of 
‘future division within Keynesian socialism which was later to prove extremely 
damaging’. Gaitskellite revisionists such as Jenkins and Jay (and often Gaitskell himself), 
‘developed an increasingly liberal bias, stressing individual freedom, a predominantly 
free market economy and a broad equality of opportunity’. Crosland appeared to develop 
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‘rather different ideas’. His central ‘organising principle’ for Labour of greater social 
equality differed from and, like Young, made him vigilant of a ‘straightforward 
meritocratic equality of opportunity’. Although broadly supportive of his conviction that 
‘‘equality’ should be regarded as the centre-piece of socialism’, embryonic divisions 
were discernible in education policy and approaches to industrial relations as early as the 
1950s, which reflected differential ‘visions’ of ‘equality’ and the ‘egalitarian future’. 
Subsequent political differences over industrial relations reform, the priorities of social 
democratic political economy and Europe exposed both ‘personal and policy 
disagreements, and the obvious difference of vision in which they were rooted’.43 
 
Tensions of Revisionist Philosophy: ‘Equality’ and ‘Liberty’ in Social Democratic 
Thought 
 
A fundamental difference of political principle between left and right (and between the 
‘Left of the Left’ and the ‘Right of the Left’) is the ‘difference in the relative priority 
assigned to…traditional ideals of liberty and equality’: ‘for the Left of the Left, equality 
has unequivocal priority over liberty…for the Right of the Left, equality has priority over 
liberty provided…both are constrained by the ancillary value of justice’. On the 
egalitarian left, the ‘priority given to equality can genuinely follow from a conviction that 
without a restriction on the liberties of the better-off…the absolute as well as the relative 
position of the disadvantaged is bound to worsen’. On the liberal left, a Rawlsian ‘appeal 
to justice can genuinely follow from a conviction that all inequalities have to be 
defensible to those who are disadvantaged by them and that all institutions ought 
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therefore to be so designed and controlled that privilege is distributed as widely as is 
compatible with basic individual freedom’.44 
 
An implicit theme of the ‘new revisionist thinkers’, and one which was to reappear 
explicitly in the 1970s and in the ‘exit’ texts of those who left to form the SDP in 1981, 
was some discussion of whether the amplified pursuit of equality was a danger to 
freedom and individual liberty.45 Jenkins had written that the ‘desire for greater equality 
has been part of the inspiration of all socialist thinkers and of all socialist movements. 
The absence of this desire, indeed, provides the most useful of all exclusive definitions of 
socialism. Where there is no egalitarianism there is no socialism’. He also noted that the 
protection of liberty was still necessary, ‘ensuring that our new society of near equals is 
left confronting a state machine in which power, both economic and political, is as widely 
diffused as possible’.46 This philosophical dilemma emerged more starkly in the 1970s as 
New Right critiques of trade union collectivism and the dangers of the expansion of the 
state through increased public expenditure found a sensitive and receptive audience 
among liberal social democrats.47 It remained an ‘unresolved problem’ of social 
democratic theory; the dilemma of reconciling an ‘individual-focused and negative 
concept of freedom – absence of restraint – with trade union collectivism and the culture 
that sustained it’. One revisionist strand had ‘always defined freedom in positive terms as 
‘something that needs to be enlarged’ rather than as simply the absence of restraint’.48 
Another now openly questioned whether the pursuit of equality had ‘gone far enough’ 




Divisions over a range of key political and policy themes in the 1970s revealed essential 
conceptual tensions of revisionist social democracy. Emerging differences in the nature 
of respective ‘socialisms’ privileged either collective, comprehensive and egalitarian or 
pluralistic, decentralist, anti-corporatist and libertarian principles and priorities. The latter 
signalled a radical departure from ‘old-style [Croslandite] revisionism’. For a younger 
generation of revisionists, the general mood of the party and disappointment at the 
perceived limitations of the 1974-79 Labour government ‘reinforced the glaring need for 
a break’ with previous revisionist politics.50 Throughout the 1970s there were calls from 
the social democratic ‘right’ inside and outside Parliament to move beyond traditional 
revisionism in response to the rise of the new left and increasing trade union power. They 
argued for Gaitskellite revisionism to adopt a new, more populist strategy to respond to 
the new desire for participation. They often described themselves as ‘Social Democrats’ 
to differentiate their method from traditional revisionism, and emphasised the point that 
inequality in power and status should be reduced by a more local, grass-roots approach. 
Some further took up the call for Labour to rethink its relationship with the large trade 
unions and to endeavour to develop community politics and small business relationships. 
They emphasised the guiding principles of pluralism, independence and freedom, and 
argued for so-called ‘Jenkinsite’ social democrats to establish a new, breakaway political 
party to reflect changing ideological priorities, as Labour had, beyond redemption, 
become too collectivist, left-wing and trade union-dominated.51  
 
John Mackintosh, as exemplar of the ‘new’ political philosophy of ‘post-revisionism’, 
arguably became the most notable and vocal social democratic theorist of an acute anti-
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left, anti-labourist and anti-corporatist position. Before his untimely death in 1978, he 
was convinced that the failures of Labour in power were an indication that the revisionist 
politics of the 1950s were now out-dated, a position broadly supported by an emerging 
‘post-revisionist’ and ‘Jenkinsite’ analysis.52 His critique of traditional revisionism was 
the claim that it lacked a sophisticated economic understanding of the mixed economy 
and its problems. Central to this analysis was the case that Labour’s failure (and British 
decline generally) was a defect of the very growth of corporatism that it had done so 
much to create and which produced feelings of impotence and indifference in the 
electorate and its governing institutions. Traditional revisionist social democracy had 
contributed to the devaluation of parliamentary democracy in favour of corporate 
pressure groups such as the CBI and the TUC. Crosland’s libertarian rejection of 
nationalisation had not gone far enough. It had been unable to break sufficiently from the 
statist strategy of the corporate socialists and the Fabians in its demands for equality and 
welfare. Principles of democracy, participation and citizenship were compromised by 
corporate interests that ‘governed’ the country, including the trade unions upon which 
Labour was dependent. He was fundamentally opposed to the primacy of the interests of 
those with a monopoly on economic power, whether they were financiers, multinational 
corporations or unions controlling key sectors of the labour force, regardless of party 
affiliations and considerations.53 In his critique of the ‘corporate power of organised 
labour’, Mackintosh was developing the anti-labourism and anti-collectivism implicit in 
revisionist thinking to a new level. Arguably, the social democratic wing, as it was now 
called, was developing a perspective and ‘reaching a point where the [new] ‘revisionists’ 




Again, this critical conceptual distinction was not a new one, and had its roots in 
theoretical differences of 1950s Labour revisionism. The social scientist Michael Young 
was head of Labour’s Research Department and primary author of Labour’s 1945 general 
election manifesto. However, Young was uncomfortable with the conceptual 
development of Labour’s post-war doctrine, particularly the ascendant revisionist dictum 
that socialism was about a narrowly-defined ‘equality’, pursued through largely statist 
means. While not fundamentally opposed to the central place of ‘equality’ in Labour’s 
ideological prospectus, he was acutely aware of the dangers of an unmediated ‘equality of 
opportunity’, as his most famous work, The Rise of the Meritocracy, demonstrates in 
savage satire.55 For Young, ‘equality’ represented only part of a broader project of the 
‘assertion of human dignity and…community’, bound up in a wider concept of 
‘brotherhood’, which socialism should represent. Simultaneously, there needed to be 
increased emphasis on both individual choice and reciprocal ‘community’, which offered 
opportunities to participate in and contribute to an active democracy beyond the realm of 
politics and the state.  
 
Arguably pre-empting the new ‘libertarian’ concerns of 1970s ‘post-revisionists’, Young 
offered a strand of social democratic thought distinct from mainstream Labour 
revisionism: it was idealistic and less constrained by party and political concerns, but also 
more unequivocally forward-looking and cutting much more explicitly and responsively 
with the grain of social trends. He appeared much readier to shed the socialist state 
ascription in a rapidly changing socio-economic climate that he perceived to be 
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outstripping even a ‘Croslandite’ analysis. He appeared to be willing to synthesise 
concepts and ideas otherwise considered contradictory to establish a clear link between 
notions of (traditional working class) community and (new) individualist consumerism. A 
willingness to acknowledge and fuse new socio-economic and consumer developments 
with core concepts also suggested a more openly appreciative view of the market in 
society.56 Labour revisionism’s adaptation of a ‘sentimental egalitarianism’, based on a 
narrow and standardised concept of ‘merit’ and Morrisonian ‘technical efficiency’, would 
not offer the receptacle for a decentred and inclusive notion of the ‘classless society’, in 
which a ‘diversity of values’ – individual, family, neighbourhood and communitarian – 
prospered.57 The sharper political deviations of social democratic revisionism in the 
1970s arguably reflected the outcome of the more cerebral intellectual debates of the 
1950s. For some, they represented a choice between Crosland’s adaption of the ‘old 
[Fabian] centralism with a bit of local agency delivery and consultation’ and Young’s 
petition for a full ‘radical devolution of economic and political power to people in their 
neighbourhoods and workplaces’. Crosland won and Labour remain(ed) ‘wedded to the 
Croslandite’ strategy.58  
 
Critiques of Labour revisionism’s state-centric and corporatist instincts in the 1970s 
reflected an increasingly explicit conceptual schism of social democracy between those 
who privileged ‘equality’ and those who now privileged ‘freedom’ as the basis of their 
political thought. While many, including Jenkins, Rodgers and Shirley Williams 
maintained recognisably ‘egalitarian’ principles, the perception of a new, dangerously 
collectivist and illiberal political environment prompted the critique of the allegedly 
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defensive and fixed positions of earlier Labour revisionism.59 Of course, there remained a 
degree of coherence and cross-over of views that owed something to common roots. 
Hattersley, for instance, was a prominent pro-European supporter of Jenkins before the 
former’s entrenched ‘Croslandite’ views of public expenditure and equality took him 
away from the emerging ‘Jenkinsite’ liberal position. Shirley Williams retained 
fundamentally egalitarian and redistributive values; in the pursuit of social justice, she 
continued to ‘believe in relatively high taxation to pay for good public services’, but her 
self-perception was one of a ‘modern’, ‘radical social democrat’ with clear liberal and 
libertarian instincts and priorities:60 
 
The old demands for equality were replaced with new demands for freedom, and [echoing 
Michael Young] the old belief in economic growth led by large and socially responsible 
corporations had been replaced by the new belief that ‘small is beautiful’…It was in their calls for 
freedom that the specific nature of the Social Democrats was revealed most starkly. In harking 
back to the decentralist traditions of…Cole and William Morris, they were throwing a veil over 
the class nature of those traditions…[the] response that the market should be freed from the fetters 
of state control was an indication of the retreat from the revisionist values of social equality and 
welfare.61 
 
Differential perspectives of the relative priority afforded to core social democratic 
principles in the context of enforced theoretical re-engagement in the 1970s, and reflected 
in a series of critical political and policy disputes, offer a neglected dimension of the 
‘considerable defector-loyalist puzzle’ of the SDP. Crewe & King suggest that the answer 
lies in the nature of respective backgrounds in, and attachments to, the Labour Party. 
Although supportive of the future founders of the SDP on the critical Common Market 
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issue, Hattersley remained in the party in 1981 on the grounds that ‘by…background 
and…path of entry into the Labour Party…[he] was very much a party machine man’.62 
But where does this leave someone like Bill Rodgers? Autobiographically, he claims his 
roots as ‘someone who believes in social justice and doesn’t find acceptable the social 
inequalities which were all around me…growing up in the 1930s…Because I’m basically 
a Labour man and I joined when I was sixteen’.63 
 
Hattersley, for instance, retained a fundamental belief in the egalitarian foundations of 
freedom, and never wavered from the ethical framework established by Crosland: 
socialism ‘is about the pursuit of equality and the protection of freedom – in the 
knowledge that until we are truly equal we will not be truly free’ and the ‘good society is 
the equal society’.64 In contrast, a sharper sense of the necessary limits and potential 
dangers to freedom of egalitarian ‘redistribution of material wealth’ based on high levels 
of public expenditure is apparent in the pre-SDP ‘exit’ texts. A common theme of this 
writing is the argument that interpretation of socialism as just equality, and equality only 
in terms of distribution, represents a narrow definition that underplays the ‘predisposition 
for liberty’ of ‘any thinking democrat’. The relentless pursuit of equality through 
distribution might be used as ‘justification for abandoning liberty…to be sure of 
achieving equality’. Rodgers, for instance, argued in post-Croslandite (‘Jenkinsite’) terms 
that just as ‘public ownership was not socialism’, a new preoccupation with ‘public 




Rodgers and other ‘Jenkinsites’ were increasingly critical of the view that (high) public 
spending was, by definition, virtuous. As the ‘mass abundance’ predicted by Crosland did 
not materialise, and as levels of economic growth receded, they were concerned with the 
lack of attention paid to wider socio-economic concerns and developments. An emerging 
fiscal theme was ‘value for money’ from public spending and across the public services. 
Public expenditure should be ‘dependent on achieving economic growth and rising 
personal living standards first’. Arguably owing more to Evan Durbin than Crosland, 
whom Rodgers considered to be ‘courageous and clear-headed…about…freedom’, they 
crucially emphasised issues of individual liberty, more freedom from the state and 
individual control of personal lives. This demanded greater attention to individual 
freedom, including lower personal taxation, and to certain spheres of collective activity 
such as industrial democracy, in which individuals were more effectively included in 
decisions governing their working lives.66 The general thrust of the perspective was that 
Labour should recognise that individuals were now placing personal consumption and 
individual freedoms above the pursuit of equality. It was a view that ‘lacked any sense of 





[Labour’s] ‘radical right’ was actively actioning to differentiate [itself] from what [it] saw 




If the Labour left has been notoriously schismatic, neither has the ‘Labour right’ in 
practice been a uniform, loyalist unit. For much of the post-war period, the complex 
ideational, ideological and political predispositions of the ‘Labour right’ were concealed 
within the loose cohesive framework of Keynesian (and Croslandite) social democracy. 
As this framework crumbled in the 1970s, giving rise to a new range of policy and 
political concerns, including membership of the Common Market, the character of 
industrial relations, emerging weaknesses of traditional social democratic political 
economy and a new radicalised realignment of influential trade unions and more 
organised and assertive Labour left, the compound intellectual and political character of 
the ‘Labour right’ and revisionist social democracy was exposed. 
 
The intention here has not been to develop an alternative model or schema of the ‘Labour 
right’. It has been to identify principal representations of the parliamentary Labour right 
and to indicate some of their limitations, ambiguities or inconsistencies against the 
backdrop of catalytic empirical episodes. The cases or examples offered are by no means 
exhaustive, but intended to illustrate a line of argument and enquiry rather than to 
systematically document each framework or narrative. Efforts to characterise the ‘Labour 
right’, arguably driven by conditions of theoretical application, have taken three broad 
forms. Firstly, a schema based on the standard monolithic political dimensions of ‘left’ 
and ‘right’ (and nebulous and shifting ‘centre’). Secondly, a rudimentary distinction of 
between old ‘trade union right’ ‘pragmatists’ and intellectual revisionist ‘dogmatists’, to 
borrow Drucker’s terms. However, it is not always clear where or when the boundaries of 
the distinction apply. Like the limited standard dimensions of ‘left’ and ‘right’, they may 
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be taken to imply that such groupings possess a uniformity and universality of outlook. A 
simple distinction between ‘labourists’ and ‘revisionists’ fails to reveal the diversity of 
‘Labour right’ ideas and politics and the intrinsic tensions of Labour revisionism itself, 
particularly as the cohesive force of its intellectual foundations fell away in the so-called 
‘crisis of social democracy’ from the late 1960s onwards. As one key participant reflects, 
‘it’s always more complicated than that’. The distinction approximates in only: 
 
‘a very, very rough and ready kind of way…if you take the so-called radical 
revisionists…it’s not the case that they all went over to the SDP, where as the trade union 
right did not all not go over to the SDP. How would you classify somebody like [James] 
Wellbeloved, for example? He certainly isn’t…at first sight one of the intellectual 
revisionist social democrats, but he did go over to the SDP. On the other hand, how would 
you classify Giles Radice who did not go over to the SDP or Philip Whitehead who did not 
go over to the SDP…so…there are a lot of nuances for that picture’.69  
 
Thirdly, there has been a wider attempt to distinguish the variety of ‘Labour right’ 
political thought and the underlying intellectual influences of its component traditions 
and personnel. The extent to which the ‘world of ideas’ can be separated from 
institutional and political context as a guide to preferences and priorities is more 
problematic. As one set of commentators note, ‘ideology and behaviour that are relatively 
straight forward to identify or quantify deviate most unpredictably from traditional core 
positions in response to political and external factors and events’. A set of perceptions 
and preferences developed in political life and conflict might, at best, ‘only approximate 
to a pure orientation’. It is preferable to analyse political identities and affiliations both 
‘through time’ and ‘in time’. It is important to think relationally as well as categorically.70 
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There is a need to consider the interaction between core positions and political and 
institutional context.  
 
The political and institutional environment of revisionist social democracy from circa the 
late 1960s offers an apposite context in which to explore this interaction in terms of 
contentious and divisive episodes of European policy, trade union reform and the future 
of social democratic political economy; and to consider the explanatory limitations of 
standard fixed conceptions of Labour’s intra-party dimensions and the neglected role of 
the estrangements and implosion of the ‘Labour right’ and Labour revisionism itself in 
the crisis and schism of British social democracy in the 1970s. From this perspective, 
Labour’s subsequent shift leftwards and the long(er)-term gestation of the SDP can be 
explained by the disconnected and incoherent response of the (revisionist) ‘Labour right’ 
to the new dilemmas of social democracy and its critics as much as by a resurgent Labour 
left and the more immediate intra-party constitutional disputes after 1979, or merely as a 
split over European policy and divisions in the party.71 Rather, the roots of the SDP 
involved a gradual process of alienation from both the wider party (left) and traditional 
(‘hard’ or ‘trade union’) ‘labourist’ colleagues of the ‘Labour right’ itself. Seemingly 
irrevocable differences over a range of policy themes and developments revealed the 
emergence of fundamental conceptual and philosophical as well as political disparities of 
Labour revisionism and the complex and composite ‘Labour right’. 
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